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Abstract This paper explores the international spillover effects of ageing through
capital markets when countries have different pension systems. We use a two-country
two-period overlapping-generations model, where the two countries only differ in
their pension schemes. Two forms of population ageing are considered, namely, an
increase in longevity and a fall in fertility. It is shown that, in the long run, a country
using a funded pension system experiences negative spillovers from the fact that the
other country uses a pay-as-you-go system. The short-run spillovers, however, are
opposite to the spillovers in the long run.
Keywords Ageing · Pensions · Spillovers
JEL Classification F21 · H55 · J11
1 Introduction
In the coming decades, differences in the extent and the timing of ageing in the
developed world will lead to international spillover effects through the capital
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market. This has been established in an extensive literature, starting with a seminal
paper by Cutler et al. (1990), followed by a number of papers presenting simulation
experiments with large multi-country overlapping-generations models (see, for ex-
ample, Brooks 2003; Fehr et al. 2005; Börsch-Supan et al. 2006; Domeij and Flodén
2006; Attanasio et al. 2006).
Less attention, however, has been paid to a second possible reason for interna-
tional spillover effects in case of ageing, i.e. differences in pension systems between
countries. Within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), for exam-
ple, there are large differences in pension arrangements. Some countries, such as
The Netherlands, have large funded schemes, whereas other countries, e.g. Italy and
Germany, rely almost completely on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems. Together with
differences in the institutional set-up of PAYG schemes, this causes savings in the
various countries to react differently to the ageing of the population, even if the
pattern of ageing is identical across countries. In a common capital market, these
differences in savings will spill over to other countries.
The aim of this paper is to explore the international spillover effects of a
symmetric ageing shock when countries in a common capital market have different
pension systems. In other words, we want to shed light on the question how, in case
of population ageing, a country with an extensive funded pension scheme (e.g. The
Netherlands) is affected by the fact that other EMU countries (such as Italy) rely to
a relatively large extent on unfunded pensions, and vice versa.
Some studies (for example, Casarico 2001; Groezen 2003; Jousten and Legros
2002) investigate what happens with capital flows when two countries that differ
in the degree of funding of their pension systems integrate their capital markets.
Casarico (2001) finds that the young and the future generations in the PAYG country
are better off in the open economy equilibrium. In the funded country, however,
welfare can either increase or decrease for the young and future generations. So,
it is not necessarily true, as one might expect, that both countries gain from the
integration of capital markets. In contrast to the aforementioned papers, we study
the consequences of ageing given that countries have an integrated capital market
but different pension arrangements. To our knowledge, our paper is one of the
first taking this approach. One exception is the paper by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006)
who also allow for differences in the generosity of public PAYG pension schemes.
In contrast to that paper, we develop a simple model that enables us to derive
an analytical solution of the transition path, to gain insight into the underlying
mechanisms of the results.
We use a two-country two-period overlapping-generations model where one
country has a PAYG pension system and the other country has a fully funded
retirement scheme. The countries are identical in all other respects and are hit by
an identical demographic shock. Two typical variants of the PAYG scheme are
distinguished: a defined-benefit scheme where the working generation bears the
burden of an ageing population by paying higher taxes, and a fixed-contribution
scheme where the burden of ageing lies with the elderly. Moreover, we consider
two forms of population ageing, namely, an increase in longevity and a decrease in
fertility.
We find that, in general, a country with funded pensions is, in the long run,
adversely affected by the existence of a PAYG scheme in the other country. This
means that a country using a funded system is more vulnerable to an ageing shock
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when it has a common capital market with a country relying on PAYG pensions.
In the short-run, however, the spillover effects may be opposite: Generations born
in the country with the funded pension scheme around the time of the demographic
shock may gain from the fact that the other country has a PAYG scheme. The reason
for this is that the rise in the capital–labour ratio, resulting from the ageing shock, is
smaller in case the funded country has integrated capital markets with a country that
uses a PAYG pension scheme instead of a funded system. As a result, the fall in the
interest rate, which especially harms these initial generations, is less.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark
model. In Section 3, we discuss the spillover effects when ageing is modelled as an
increase in longevity, first in case of a defined-benefit PAYG scheme and then shortly
for the case of fixed contributions. Section 4 deals with modifications of the model.
We analyse the spillover effects with a decline in fertility instead of an increase in
longevity (Section 4.1) and with a more general type of utility function (Section 4.2).
Moreover, we discuss how the results would change in case of anticipated and
asymmetric shocks (Section 4.3). The final section concludes.
2 The model
Following Buiter (1981), we use a two-period overlapping-generations model of an
open economy. The world consists of two countries, country P and country F, and
the only difference between the two countries is the way the pensions are financed.
Country P uses a PAYG system, and country F has a fully funded retirement scheme.
2.1 Demographics
Both economies are populated with non-altruistic, identical individuals who live for
at most two periods. So, in each period, both a young and an old generation are alive.
We assume that an agent born at t lives throughout old age with probability εt+1. εt
can be interpreted as average longevity; when εt rises, the expected lifespan of people
is longer.
The active population, Lit, is supposed to increase at the same exogenous rate nt.
1
The number of active (young) people at time t is then:
Lit = Li0 ·
t∏
j=0
(1 + n j) (1)
where Li0 is the initial population size in country i, i = P, F. A decrease in nt can
be interpreted as a fall in the fertility rate. As the countries may differ in their initial





= ν; so, if LP0 is normalised to 1, then ν tells us the relative size of LF0 .
1Throughout this paper, both economies are assumed to be dynamically efficient, i.e. rt > nt, ∀t.
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2.2 Production
All variables in the model are expressed as the amount per young individual in the
country. For example, kit stands for the amount of capital per young individual in
period t in country i. Production per young individual is described by a standard
neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function, f (kit). Perfect competi-
tion among producers results in the usual equilibrium conditions, rit = f ′(kit) − δ
and wit = f (kit) − kit f ′(kit), where rit is the interest rate, wit denotes the real wage
and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. There is perfect capital mobility between
the two countries, but labour is immobile. Because capital can freely move across
countries, the interest rates will be equalised, i.e. rPt = rFt = rt, ∀t. As both countries
are endowed with the same production technology, we have kPt = kFt = kt, and
consequently wPt = wFt = wt.
2.3 Government
The government in country P runs a PAYG pension system, that is, the pension
benefits of the elderly (zPt ) are covered by lump-sum
2 taxes of the young (τ Pt ).
Because, at time t, there are εt LPt−1 old agents and L
P






In country F, the government invests the contributions of the young (τ Ft ) and returns
them with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to the then old agents
(zFt+1). As only a fraction of εt+1 of young people born at t survives to period t + 1,

























where ρ > 0 stands for the (constant) pure rate of time preference of an individual,
cy,it is consumption when young and c
o,i
t+1 is consumption in the second period of life.
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. Introducing endogenous
labour supply instead would complicate our analysis to a large extent, as this leads us
into questions like how labour supply enters the utility function. Moreover, empirical
2Assuming proportional taxes, instead of lump-sum taxes, would lead to smaller effects, as an
increase in wages, after ageing, will dampen the effect on taxes. Qualitatively, our results will not
change however.
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studies find that the labour supply elasticity is fairly small for the principal earner of
a household; see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an overview. We assume perfect
annuity markets,3 which implies that the assets of those who deceased are distributed
among the people who survived. The total return on savings is, therefore, 1+rt+1
εt+1 . The
consolidated lifetime budget constraint is:
cy,it +
εt+1 co,it+1




1 + rt+1 (5)
Maximising lifetime utility with respect to the lifetime budget constraint gives the
following expressions for individual optimal savings in both countries:
sPt =
εt+1
1 + ρ + εt+1
[
wt − τ Pt
] − 1 + ρ
1 + ρ + εt+1
εt+1 zPt+1
1 + rt+1 (6)
sFt + τ Ft =
εt+1
1 + ρ + εt+1 wt (7)
Note that optimal savings in country F do not depend on the interest rate. The reason
is that, given a logarithmic utility function, the intertemporal substitution elasticity
is equal to one. For the same reason, optimal savings in country P only react to the
interest rate because it changes the net present value of the pension benefit.
2.5 Equilibrium international capital market
Individuals invest their savings either in the home country or abroad. Their portfolios
will be composed such that interest rates are equalised. Equilibrium in the interna-
tional capital market is given by:
sPt + ν
(
sFt + τ Ft
) = (1 + ν)(1 + nt+1)kt+1 (8)
From Eqs. 6 and 7, it can be seen that country F has higher savings than country P,
implying that country F exports capital abroad.
3 Increase in longevity
One of the causes of population ageing is that people live longer. Therefore, in
this section, we analyse the international spillover effects when longevity increases
permanently at t = 0. The demographic shock is unexpected, i.e. people do not adjust
their behaviour in the period before the shock. Moreover, the size and the timing of
the ageing shock is the same in both countries. As a result, ageing will induce capital
flows between the two countries only because the pension systems differ.
3Relaxing this assumption would probably only reinforce our results, as in the absence of a perfect
annuity market, households in the funded country will have a stronger incentive to save for old age.
As a result, capital flows from the funded to the unfunded country, which drive most of our results,
will only be larger.
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We employ the method of comparative dynamics, adopted from Judd (1982), to
calculate the effect of the longevity shock analytically. The probability of reaching
the second period of life at time t is given by:
εt = ε + πht (9)
where ε denotes the initial steady-state value,4 ht describes the time pattern of a per-
turbation of this steady-state value and π reflects the magnitude of this perturbation.
Ageing is reflected by a positive value of ht.5 To focus solely on the effects of an
increase in longevity, we assume that there is no population growth, i.e. nt ≡ 0 ∀t.
The effects of an ageing shock can be traced by linearising the capital-accumulation
Eq. 8 with respect to π around the initial steady state. The resulting first-order
difference equation for kt describes the capital–labour ratio changes over time and
the determining factors. Given the change in the capital–labour ratio, we can derive
the changes in all other variables.
First, we explain the effects of an increase in longevity when the PAYG system is
characterised by defined benefits. After that, we shortly describe what changes when
the PAYG system is characterised by fixed contributions instead.
3.1 Defined benefits
This section analyses the international spillover effects of population ageing in case
the PAYG scheme is characterised by defined benefits. In terms of the model, this
means that the pension benefit in country P is fixed at zP (zPt = zP ∀t). This implies
that, in response to a longer expected lifespan, taxes have to increase to keep the
PAYG scheme balanced. So, the burden of ageing is entirely borne by the working
population.
3.1.1 The change in the capital–labour ratio
Using the method described above, we obtain the following first-order difference
















(1 + ρ)(w − τ P1+ν )
	(1 + ρ + ε) −
2︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + ρ)2zP




where 	 ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) − (1+ρ)εzP f ′′(k)
(1+ν)(1+r)2 > 0.
4Throughout the paper, we omit time subscripts to denote the (initial) steady-state value of the
respective variable.
5Because we assume that longevity increases permanently; this means that h0 = h1 = . . . = h∞ > 0.
However, as people do not anticipate the rise in longevity, we have that Et=−1(h0) = 0.
6In Appendix 1, we show the derivation of this expression.
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Equation 10 shows the change in the capital–labour ratio after an increase in
longevity when the two economies have different pension schemes. To analyse the
international spillover effects, we derive the same kind of equations for the situation
where the two economies use the same pension system. The first-order difference
























whereas the expression for the change in kt+1 in case both economies use a funded











	F(1 + ρ + ε) ht+1 (12)
with 	 P ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) − (1+ρ)εzP f ′′(k)
(1+r)2 > 0 and 	
F ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) > 0.
By comparing the capital–labour ratio changes in case the two countries have the
same pension system (Eqs. 11 and 12) with the change in the capital–labour ratio
when the two countries have different pension schemes (Eq. 10), we derive the pure
spillover effects of pensions and ageing in a common capital market.7,8
As the increase in longevity at t = 0 is not anticipated, savings at t = −1 do
not adjust, and as a result, the capital stock per worker does not change at the
time of the shock, that is, ∂k0
∂π
= 0. At t = 0, there are several effects that influence
optimal savings in both countries in different directions. First of all, people have
more incentives to save because the chance of reaching the second period of life
is higher (this effect is indicated by a 1 in the first-order difference equations). In
country P, however, the existence of PAYG pension benefits has a depressing effect
on savings when longevity goes up. The reason for this effect (indicated by a 2) is
that the present value of the pension benefit rises, which raises lifetime income and
thus consumption in both periods of life. For a given net wage income, the increase
in consumption when young implies lower savings. Moreover, with a defined-benefit
PAYG pension scheme, savings decrease, as contributions have to go up to keep
the PAYG system balanced (this is the so-called dependency-ratio effect, indicated
by a 3). So, the effect on total savings, and the capital–labour ratio, is ambiguous.
7To exclude the effects of integration, it is assumed that the initial steady state is the same in all cases.
8Assuming that both countries have the same type of pension system and comparing this to the
situation where each adopts a different scheme is the same as comparing the open equilibrium to
the closed-economy outcome: When both countries have the same pension design and when they are
subject to the same ageing shock, there are no international capital flows, and therefore, it is as if the
countries were closed.
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Fig. 1 Change in kt

















From Eq. 10, it follows that, given that ht = ht+1, the capital–labour ratio rises after
a permanent increase in longevity if:
zP
1 + ν <
(1 + ρ)(1 + r) w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) (13)
We assume that this condition is fulfilled.9 The increase in the common capital–
labour ratio at t = 1 leads to higher wages, which engenders higher savings in both
countries (this is the first term in the three equations). Due to these higher savings,
the capital–labour ratio continues to rise.
Savings unambiguously rise more in the funded country than in the PAYG
country, as effects 2 and 3 do not appear in Eq. 12. When the funded country
has a common capital market with a PAYG country, part of its extra savings
flows to country P. To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we also show some
numerical simulation experiments.10 The change in the capital–labour ratio for the
three different cases can be seen in Fig. 1.
3.1.2 The change in utility
To infer whether a country gains or loses from being in an integrated capital market
with a country that has another pension system, we compare the utility effects of
9As shown in Appendix 2.1, this condition holds for realistic parameter values. The appendix also
shows, however, that in case both countries have a PAYG scheme, the contribution rate does not
have to be unrealistically high for the capital–labour ratio to decrease after a longevity shock. This
would not change the international spillover effects qualitatively however.
10The graphs are based on simulations with f (kt) = k0.3t , ν = 1, τ
P
w
= 0.2, ε = 0.94 and ht = 0.05.
Capital depreciates at 5% per year, and assuming that one period is 30 years, this means that δ = 1 −
(0.95)30 = 0.7854. Agents are relatively patient with a time preference rate of 1% per year, so that
ρ = (1.01)30 − 1 = 0.3478. We also derived numerically the non-linear transition path and compared
the numerical results with those found with the method of comparative dynamics. The relative error
of the linearised path was 1% at most.
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Fig. 2 Change in U Pt













ageing in the different cases. In Appendix 3, we derive the long-run change in utility

















The last term indicates that, for a given production capacity, an increase in longevity
leads to a lower utility, as individuals have to share total lifetime consumption with
more people.11 As explained in the appendix, the whole term in front of ∂k∞
∂ε∞ is posi-
tive. This means that the rise in the capital–labour ratio after an increase in longevity
reduces the direct negative utility effects. However, this indirect positive effect on
utility is a second-order effect and, therefore, not large enough to compensate for
the negative utility effects, as can also be seen in Fig. 2.
The rise in the capital–labour ratio is larger in case the PAYG country is in a
common capital market with a funded country instead of with a PAYG country. As
a result, in the long run, the PAYG country gains from having a common capital
market with a country that has a fully funded pension scheme. Notice, however, that
the spillovers are exactly opposite for the generation born at the time of the ageing
shock (t = 0). The reason for this is that the fall in the interest rate resulting from
the rise in the capital–labour ratio, which especially harms this initial generation, is
less in case both countries use a PAYG system. As these initial generations do not
enjoy the gains that result from a larger increase in wages when the economies have
different pension schemes, the negative utility effects of the lower interest rate are
smaller in case the PAYG country does not have a common capital market with a
country using a funded pension system.
11To compare lifetime utility before and after ageing properly, we take the value of εt constant at
unity. So, we do not take into account that a higher life expectancy is actually something that is nice
for people. If this is taken into account, the overall utility effects of an increase in longevity are still
negative however. An increase in longevity only results in a higher utility if people can work longer.
We leave this for future research.
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(sF + τ F)
ε
(15)
Again, there is the direct negative effect on utility because consumption has to be
shared with more people. For the funded country, however, it is not necessarily
true that a higher capital–labour ratio results in a higher utility. As explained in the
appendix, there are two opposing mechanisms, which can make the whole expression
in front of ∂k∞
∂ε∞ either negative or positive. For realistic values of the different
parameters, it is positive however. Because the capital–labour ratio increases less in
case the funded country has a common capital market with a PAYG country rather
than with a funded-pension country, the fall in utility in country F is larger in the
former case. So, the funded country experiences negative spillover effects from the
PAYG country in the long run, as shown in Fig. 3.
As was the case for the PAYG country, the short-run spillovers are opposite to
the spillovers in the long run. The reason is that the initial generations only incur
the losses that result from a falling interest rate; they do not have the gains from the
higher wages. As the fall in the interest rate is larger in case both countries use a
fully funded system, these generations experience a larger utility loss. Notice that the
effect of interest rate decreases has more impact in the funded country than in the
PAYG country, as households save more in the funded country. As a result, it takes
more generations to invert the spillover effects.
In the simulation graphs, we assumed that the two economies have the same
size, that is, ν = 1. However, as most EMU countries mainly use PAYG pension
schemes, a country like The Netherlands, relying to a relatively large extent on
funded pensions, can be considered as relatively small. In case the funded country
is smaller than the PAYG country, that is, when ν < 1, the negative spillover effects
for the funded country become larger.
Fig. 3 Change in U Ft
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3.2 Fixed contributions
If the PAYG pension system is characterised by fixed contributions, the change in












(1 + ρ)(w − τ P1+ν )




(1 + ν)	(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) +
3︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + ρ) τ P
(1 + ν)	(1 + r)ε
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ht+1 (16)
The only difference with Eq. 10 is the dependency-ratio effect (indicated by a 3 in
both equations). In case of defined benefits, the higher dependency ratio led to less
savings because contributions had to rise to keep the PAYG system balanced. With a
fixed PAYG tax, however, pension benefits are reduced due to a higher dependency
ratio, which increases savings. This implies that the capital–labour ratio increases
more in case the PAYG scheme is characterised by fixed contributions, resulting in
a smaller decrease in utility after a longevity shock. However, as shown formally in
Appendix 4, savings in country F still increase more than in country P, so that the rise
in the capital–labour ratio is smaller when country F has integrated capital markets
with a country that uses a PAYG pension system. This can also be seen in Fig. 4.
In the long run, this results in positive spillover effects for the PAYG country and
negative spillovers for the funded country. It should be noticed, however, that the
spillovers are smaller than in the defined benefits case.
Fig. 4 Change in kt
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Our main findings can be summarised as follows:
Result 1. In case ageing is characterised by an unexpected increase in longevity:
1. Savings in the funded country unambiguously rise more than in the PAYG
country, which leads to capital flows from the funded country to the PAYG
country.
2. In the long run, the funded country experiences negative spillover effects from
the PAYG scheme in the other country.
3. The short-run spillovers are opposite to the spillovers in the long run.
4. The spillovers are smaller in case the PAYG pension system is characterised by
fixed contributions compared to a defined-benefit PAYG scheme.
4 Modifications
In this section, the analysis presented above is modified in several ways to investigate
the robustness of our results. First, we study the international spillover effects in
case population ageing is caused by a lower fertility rate. Second, we consider
a more general type of utility function. More precisely, we analyse whether the
spillover effects change when preferences are represented by a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) utility function instead of a logarithmic utility function. Finally,
we briefly discuss the effect of anticipated and asymmetric shocks.
4.1 Decrease in fertility
The ageing of the population in the industrialised world is not only caused by
the fact that people live longer. Another important reason is that women give
birth to a smaller number of children, that is, the fertility rate is declining. In this
section, we analyse the spillover effects of pensions and population ageing in case
of an unanticipated permanent decrease in fertility at t = 0. As before, we employ
the method of comparative dynamics. Let the fertility rate at time t be given by
nt = n + πgt. Ageing is reflected by a negative value of gt.12 To isolate the effects
of a fertility decline, it is assumed that agents live throughout their old age with
certainty, i.e. εt ≡ 1 ∀t. And again, we distinguish between a defined-benefit and a
fixed-contribution PAYG scheme.
The main difference with a longevity shock is that a decline in the rate of
population growth leads to a shrinking labour force, so that less investment is needed
to keep the capital–labour ratio constant. This so-called capital-thickening effect has a
direct positive effect on the capital–labour ratio. As a result of this capital-thickening
effect, a fall in fertility can actually have positive utility effects for individuals.
12A permanent fall in fertility implies that g0 = g1 = . . . = g∞ < 0, but as the decline in fertility is
not anticipated, Et=−1(g0) = 0.
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Fig. 5 Change in kt

































 ≡ (2 + ρ) − (1+ρ)zP f ′′(k)
(1+ν)(1+r)2 > 0.
The just described capital-thickening effect is indicated by a 4 in Eq. 17. As before,
the fall in fertility has a dependency-ratio effect in the PAYG country (effect 3),
which affects savings negatively in case of a defined-benefit system.13 Because the
country with the funded pension system does not have the negative dependency ratio
effect, the capital–labour ratio increases more when this country is not integrated
with country P. Figure 5 confirms these results.14
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the effects of the decrease in fertility on utility in the
PAYG country and the funded country, respectively. Notice that lifetime utility is
higher in the funded country in the long run as compared to the initial steady state,
which is due to the capital-thickening effect. In the PAYG country, however, the
long-run utility effects are negative, as in our benchmark simulation the dependency-
ratio effect dominates the capital-thickening effect. In case the PAYG system is not
too large, that is, when the dependency-ratio effect is not too large, people in country
13As in Section 3.1, we can derive a condition that has to hold for the capital–labour ratio to rise after
an ageing shock. From Eq. 17, it follows that, given gt = gt+1, kt rises after a permanent decline in
the fertility rate if z
P
1+ν < (2 + ρ)k. As shown in Appendix 2.2, this condition holds for a large range
of parameter values.
14In these simulation graphs, it is assumed that the population size is constant in the initial steady
state (n = 0). Assuming a positive population growth rate in the original steady state does not
qualitatively change our results. We take gt = −0.1.
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Fig. 6 Change in U Pt














P also experience positive utility effects of a fall in fertility in the long run. From
simulations, it follows that this is the case if τ P < 0.13w.
The international spillover effects of a fertility shock can also be seen from these
graphs. Figure 7 shows that, in the long run, individuals in country F experience
negative spillover effects from the PAYG scheme in the other country. That is, utility
rises more in the long run if country F has a common capital market with a country
that also has funded pensions. People in the PAYG country, however, gain in the
long run from having integrated capital markets with a country that uses a funded
pension system (Fig. 6). In the short-run, the spillovers are opposite to the effects in
the long run as was the case in Section 3.1. So, the international spillover effects do
not change qualitatively compared to the effects of the longevity shock.
Fig. 7 Change in U Ft














Beggar thy thrifty neighbour 947
Fig. 8 Change in kt













The first-order difference equation for ∂kt+1
∂π


















(1 + ρ) τ P
(1 + ν)
 (1 + r)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ gt+1 (18)
As in Section 3.2, the dependency-ratio effect (effect 3) works in the opposite
direction as in the defined-benefit case, i.e. leads to higher savings as pension benefits
have to decrease after a fall in fertility. As a result, this effect intensifies the capital-
thickening effect, so that individuals in the PAYG country now also experience
positive long-run utility effects of a fertility decline. Moreover, because the funded
country has no dependency-ratio effect, the capital–labour ratio actually rises less in
this country. This means that the spillover effects turn around; this holds both for the
short-run and the long run, so that in the long run, citizens in country P suffer and
those living in country F gain from having an integrated capital market with a country
that uses another pension scheme. Figure 8, however, shows that the difference
between the change in kt in the two countries is very small, especially in the long run.
This implies that these opposite spillovers are also very small. Moreover, the next
section shows that these spillovers are not robust to changes in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
4.2 CES utility function
The results presented until now are based on a logarithmic utility function, which
means that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ ) is equal to one. In the
literature, values taken for σ range from 14 to
1
2 ,
15 which implies that our assumption
15Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), for example, assume a value of 14 .
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Fig. 9 Change in kt
















of σ = 1 is probably not very realistic. Therefore, we also simulated the model for
smaller values of σ .16 If σ < 1, the income effect is larger than the substitution effect,
and a falling interest rate leads to higher savings. This positive effect on savings is
largest in the funded country because it has the highest savings in the initial steady
state. Consequently, the negative spillover effects for the funded country in case σ =
1 will only be reinforced if σ < 1. This gives the following result:
Result 2. The findings stated in Result 1 do not change if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is smaller than one.
In the previous subsection, it was shown that, in case of a fertility shock and
a fixed-contributions PAYG scheme, savings in country P increased more than in
country F when σ = 1, resulting in small positive spillover effects for the funded
country. For a small enough value of σ , however, the interest rate effect of σ < 1
dominates the dependency-ratio effect, so that savings in country F increase more
than in country P. This is illustrated in Fig. 9, where the change in kt for σ = 14
is shown.
This means that the funded country experiences negative spillover effects of the
PAYG scheme as in the other cases. So, we can conclude that, for smaller and
probably more realistic values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
long-run spillovers for the funded country are negative in all considered cases.
The main result of a fertility decline is:
Result 3. In case ageing is characterised by an unexpected decrease in fertility,
for realistic values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution the PAYG scheme
causes negative spillovers to the funded country in the long run, while in the short-
16For expositional clarity, we do not show the analytical expressions for the case of a CES utility
function.
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run the spillovers are positive. So the spillovers do not differ qualitatively from those
in case of an increase in longevity.
4.3 Anticipated and asymmetric shocks
So far, we have only analysed unexpected demographic shocks. It is often argued,
however, that the demographic changes that characterise population ageing are
largely anticipated. Therefore, we also studied the results of an increase in longevity
and a decrease in fertility that is anticipated one period before the shock actually
takes place. Only the short-run effects of the shocks are slightly different in this
case; the long-run results are identical to the ones presented in the previous sections.
Differences are largest in case of an anticipated increase in longevity and a defined-
benefits PAYG scheme. In that case, savings already adjust in the period before the
shock, which leads to a rise in the capital–labour ratio at t = 0 as a net result of
effects 1 and 2 in Eqs. 10, 11 and 12. Just as with an unexpected shock, from t = 0
on, there is a dependency-ratio effect, which negatively affects the capital–labour
ratio in the next period. As a result of this, in case both countries use a PAYG
system, the increase in kt at t = 1 is smaller than at t = 0. The spillover effects are
not qualitatively different however.
A further robustness check is to assume asymmetric ageing, i.e. longevity or
fertility may change more in one country than in the other. The model can easily
be extended to allow for this. Let us consider two extreme cases: ageing only in
country F and ageing only in country P. In the former case, savings will only increase
in the funded country, which obviously leads to a large capital flow from country
F to country P and thus reinforces our results. In the latter case, savings will only
increase in the PAYG country. This clearly reverses the spillover effect: Capital now
flows from the ageing unfunded country to the funded country. Due to the PAYG
pensions, the capital flow in this case is smaller than in the opposite one. Therefore,
when both extreme cases are combined, as we did in our model, a net capital flow
from country F to country P results.
5 Concluding remarks
In the coming decades, most European countries will have an ageing population.
These countries differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems. On the one
hand, there are countries like the UK and The Netherlands that have an extensive
funded pension system. Most other countries, on the other hand, mainly rely on
unfunded pensions. These differences in pension schemes engender different saving
responses when the population is ageing, which leads to capital flows. This paper
focuses on the question how, in case of population ageing, countries are affected by
the fact that other countries use other pension systems. We find that, in the long run, a
PAYG country gains from having a common capital market with a country relying on
funded pensions; the main reason being that, in the funded country, savings increase
more in response to ageing. A country using a funded retirement scheme, on the
other hand, experiences long-run negative spillover effects from the PAYG system
in the other country. The short-run spillovers, however, are opposite to the spillovers
in the long run. In other words, the initial generations in the funded country gain
from the fact that the other country uses a PAYG scheme, whereas these initial
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generations in the PAYG country are negatively affected by the funded system in
the other country.
We have shown that our results are quite robust for modifications to the basic
model used in this paper. Extensions of the analysis that we leave for future research
would, for example, be to allow for endogenous labour supply, and the fact that an
increase in longevity can also lengthen the working period of people. Moreover, this
paper considers balanced PAYG pension systems, that is, in response to population
ageing, contributions or pension benefits adjust in such a way so that the PAYG
scheme does not run a deficit. Governments in funded countries, however, are mainly
concerned about the negative effects of unbalanced PAYG schemes. In other words,
they worry how their country will be affected when countries with PAYG schemes
use government debt to cope with the costs of ageing. In the future, we also want to
extend the model presented in this paper to allow for government debt. Moreover,
by including monetary policy, it is also possible to analyse the spillover effects in case
governments put pressure on the central bank to accommodate, so that their debt
burden is reduced. This paper, however, already shows that countries with funded
pensions are mostly negatively affected by the fact that other countries have PAYG
pension schemes, even when the government of the PAYG country keeps its pension
system balanced.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the first-order difference equation
of the capital–labour ratio
In this appendix, we derive the first-order difference equation for the evolution of
the capital–labour ratio given in Eq. 10. Linearising the capital-accumulation Eq. 8
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Substituting these last two expressions into Eq. 24, we obtain Eq. 10.
Appendix 2: Conditions for a long-run increase in kt
2.1 Longevity shock
As explained in Section 3.1, the capital–labour ratio rises after a permanent increase
in longevity as long as:
zP
1 + ν <
(1 + ρ)(1 + r) w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) (27)
In the same way, we can obtain a condition for the case where the PAYG country
does not have a common capital market with a country that uses a funded system:
zP <
(1 + ρ)(1 + r)w
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r) + (1 + ρ)2 + ε(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) (28)
The two graphs below show how the sign of these two conditions changes for
different parameter values.17 For positive values on the vertical axis, the above
conditions hold, and an increase in longevity leads to an increase in the capital–
labour ratio. The horizontal axis shows the relative size of the lump-sum PAYG tax
compared to the wage.
As can be seen in Fig. 10, condition 27 holds in the standard case as long as τ P <
0.6w. For other parameter values, the PAYG system can be even larger. Therefore,
17The standard case is characterised by α = 0.3, ε = 0.94, ν = 1, δ = 0.7854 and ρ = 0.3478. See also
note 10.
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Fig. 10 Condition 27















we can say that, for realistic parameter values, the capital–labour ratio increases after
a rise in longevity when one country has a PAYG scheme and the other country uses
a funded system.
In case both countries use a PAYG system (see Fig. 11), the capital–labour ratio
only rises after a permanent increase in longevity as long as τ P < 0.28w. This is not
an unrealistically high value for the contribution rate of the PAYG system, especially
when expenditures on medical care are included, implying that the capital–labour
ratio may actually fall after a rise in longevity when both countries use a PAYG
scheme. This is the point Fehr et al. (2005) make. They argue that the increase in
taxes needed to finance the benefits is so large that the capital–labour ratio falls
after an ageing shock. Most other studies that use multi-country general equilibrium
models, however, find that ageing increases the capital stock per worker; see Brooks
(2003), Miles (2001), McMorrow and Röger (2004), Börsch-Supan et al. (2006),
Domeij and Flodén (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2006). It appears, however, that the
results of Fehr et al. (2005) are mainly driven by the fact that the effective labour
supply is rising due to labour-augmenting technical progress, which more than offsets
the reduction in the labour force when the economy is ageing. But it is not obvious
at all whether technical progress will be able to offset the negative effects on the
supply of labour. Therefore, we follow the other studies and assume that an increase
in longevity results in a higher capital–labour ratio if both countries rely on PAYG
pensions when we present the simulation graphs in the main text.18 The spillovers do
not change qualitatively when kPPt falls instead; the reason being that the spillovers
depend on the relative change in kF Ft to k
PP
t . As the dependency-ratio effect is absent
when both countries use funded pensions, the capital–labour ratio unambiguously
increases more in that case, that is, we always have that dkF Ft > dk
PP
t .
18The simulation graphs are based on the assumption that τ P = 0.2w.
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Fig. 11 Condition 28


















As explained in footnote 13, the capital–labour ratio rises after a permanent decline
in fertility if:
zP
1 + ν < (2 + ρ)k, (29)
whereas this condition in case both countries have a PAYG pension scheme is
equal to:
zP < (2 + ρ)k (30)
As before, we produce graphs that show how the sign of these two conditions changes
for different parameter values.
Fig. 12 Condition 29
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Fig. 13 Condition 30

















Figure 12 shows that condition 29 holds in the standard case as long as τ P < 0.8w,
whereas we can see in Fig. 13 that condition 30 holds if τ P < 0.55w. This means that,
in case ageing is characterised by a fall in the fertility rate, the capital–labour ratio
only falls when the PAYG system is unrealistically large.
Appendix 3: Effects on utility
In this appendix, we derive the expressions for the long-run change in utility in both
countries. From these equations, we can infer the relationship between the change in
the capital–labour ratio and utility.
3.1 PAYG country
First, we derive the change in long-run utility in country P. Therefore, we first need














































19This equation shows the change in utility for a person living for two periods with certainty, i.e.
ε = 1.
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Dividing this expression by ∂ε∞
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, we get an expression for the change in U P in the





















cy,P(1+r) < 0 because f
′′(k) < 0.
2. sP − k(1 + r) < 0 because we know that sP < k(1 + n): Country P is a capital
importer in the initial steady state. And because we assumed dynamic efficiency
(r > n), we know that k(1 + n) < k(1 + r). So that sP < k(1 + r).
These two points imply that an increase in the capital–labour ratio, after an
increase in longevity, has positive utility effects. There are two reasons for this result:
1. A higher capital–labour ratio leads to a lower interest rate, which is good for the
country that borrows money (the PAYG country).
2. Moreover, a lower interest rate means that the economy is closer to the Golden
Rule point (r = n).
As the rise in the capital–labour ratio is larger in case the PAYG country has
integrated capital markets with a country that uses a funded system instead of PAYG
system, utility is also higher in that case.
3.2 Funded country
Unfortunately, it is not possible to draw such a clear conclusion for the country that
uses a funded pension system. The main intuition for this is as follows. Again, we
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have that a higher capital–labour ratio is good for the funded country because a
lower interest rate causes the economy to be closer to its Golden Rule point. On
the other hand, a lower interest rate is bad for the funded country because it is a
lender of money. This can be shown more formally as follows (using the same kind
of technique used above for the PAYG country). The expressions for the long-run
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Substituting the equations for consumption 39 and 40 into the equation for utility 41,




as before, the following expression





























(sF + τ F)
ε
, (43)






is negative. But we cannot say anything about the sign of the
second term
(
(sF + τ F) − k(1 + r)). Firstly, we know that, in the initial steady state,
country F is a capital exporter, which means that sF + τ F > k(1 + n). Secondly, it
holds that r > n because we assume dynamic efficiency, implying that k(1 + r) >
k(1 + n). So, there are two opposing mechanisms, meaning that we do not know
whether sF + τ F − k(1 + r) will be negative or positive. The first effect reflects the
fact that a lower interest rate is bad for a country that is a lender in the international
capital market, the second effect is the Golden Rule effect. In case the first effect
dominates the second, sF + τ F − k(1 + r) is positive, and the whole term in front of
∂k∞
∂ε∞ is negative, implying that an increase in the capital–labour ratio after an increase
in longevity actually affects utility negatively. On the other hand, when the second
effect dominates the first, we have the same result as for the PAYG country: A higher
capital–labour ratio leads to a higher utility in the funded country. This is the same
conclusion as in Casarico (2001).
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Fig. 14 sF + τ F − k(1 + r)














In Fig. 14, we present a graph that shows how the sign of sF + τ F − k(1 + r)
(vertical axis) changes for different parameter values.20 The horizontal axis shows
the depreciation rate (δ).
This graph shows that sF + τ F − k(1 + r) < 0 for various values of the parameters,
which means that the Golden Rule effect dominates the interest rate effect. This in
turn implies that, for realistic parameter values, a rise in the capital–labour ratio has
positive utility effects in the funded country.21 As the capital–labour ratio increases
more in case the funded country has a common capital market with a country that
also uses a funded pension scheme, opposed to a PAYG system, utility is higher in
that case.
Appendix 4: Proof that dkP Pt < dk
FF
t
In this appendix, we prove that savings in the funded country still increase more
than in the PAYG country when the PAYG scheme is characterised by fixed
contributions (Section 3.2).This implies that the capital–labour ratio in the funded
country increases less in case it has a common capital market with a country using a
PAYG pension system.
Savings in the funded country increase more than in the PAYG country after an
increase in longevity in case the following condition holds:
(1 + ρ)(w − τ P)
	 P(1 + ρ + ε) −
(1 + ρ)2zP
	 P(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) +
(1 + ρ)τ P
	 P(1 + r) ε <
(1 + ρ)w
	F(1 + ρ + ε) , (44)
20In the standard case, we have the following parameter values: ρ = 0.3478, τ P
w
= 0.2, ν = 1, α = 0.3
and ε = 0.94.
21It is actually possible to have sF + τ F − k(1 + r) > 0. This is, for example, the case when ρ = 0 and
δ > 0.87. A time preference rate of zero is not very realistic however. Therefore, we conclude that,
for realistic parameter values, it holds that sF + τ F − k(1 + r) < 0.
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which can be written as:
ε(1 + ρ)(1 + r)(w − τ P) − ε(1 + ρ)2 zP + (1 + ρ)(1 + ρ + ε) τ P
	 P(1 + ρ + ε)(1 + r) ε <
(1 + ρ)w
	F(1 + ρ + ε)
(45)
where:
	 P ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) − (1 + ρ) ε z
P f ′′(k)
(1 + r)2 > 0 (46)
	F ≡ (1 + ρ + ε) > 0 (47)
and 	 P > 	F .















so that the right-hand side is always positive. This implies that Eq. 48 always holds
and that the positive dependency-ratio effect in case of fixed contributions is not
large enough to compensate for the negative effects a PAYG system has in general,
so that savings in the funded country increase more than in the PAYG country.
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